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ABSTRACT
Through use of an abbreviated form of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), 48 subjects were assigned
to either normal or superior IQ groups.

With the constraint

that equal numbers go to each group, .subjects were then randomly assigned to either attribute identification (AI) or
rule learning

(RL)

conceptual learning tasks.

Using a recep-

tio~ paradigm, subjects solved bidimensional (two-valued) concepts for each of three conceptual rules (conjunctive, disjunctive, conditional).

It was expected that the order of

rule difficulty and subjects' truth table problem solving
strategies would vary as a function of the type of conceptual
task and IQ level.
Rejection of the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance precluded direct comparison of AI and RL tasks.

Sep-

arate analyses of variance for each task type examined subjects' error rates, hypotheses, and trials to criterion.
Results ~evealed an effect of IQ level on trials to
criterion for both tasks.

Superior IQ subjects performed

significantly better than did normal IQ subjects on this
measure.

The main effect of conceptual rule revealed a con-

junctive (easiest), disjunctive, conditional (most difficult)
vii

order of difficulty for the AI task.

In the RL task, there

was a reversal of difficulty between the conjunctive and disjunctive rules.

In both tasks, the main effect was consis-

tently due to the difficulty of the conditional rule for both
IQ groups.

Subjects' problem solving strategies were examined

in the context of the logical truth table of stimulus classification for bidimensional concepts.
found on problem solving strategy.

No effect of IQ was
A main effect of truth

table class was obtained for the RL task only.

This effect

showed TT and FF classes to be easier than the TF and FT
classes for all rules.
Rule difficulty and problem solving strategy were
discussed in terms of the Sawyer-Johnson inference model.
The applicability of the model to AI and RL tasks was considered.
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INTRODUCTION

The primary definitions of intellect and intelligence in Webster's New World Dictionary (1974) refer to the
abilities to perceive relationships and differences, to
learn or understand from experience,· to acquire and retain
knowledge, and to use reason in effectively solving problems
or directing conduct.

An examination of the experimental

literature on problem solving and conceptual behavior reveals that these same general abilities apparently differentiate successful and unsuccessful experimental subjects.
This study investigates and attempts to determine the
extent to which the abilities defined as "intelligence"
(as expressed by the IQ) relate to problem solving and conceptual abilities (as demonstrated by performance on
concept learning tasks).

This determination is made by

examining subjects' performance on concept learning tasks
as a function of task difficulty and intelligence.
In the study of conceptual behavior, a class concept is generally characterized by the presence or absence
of one or more stimulus values and a rule specifying the
necessary relationship between the relevant attributes
(Haygood

&

Bourne, 1965).

In a bidimensional concept,
1

2

there are two relevant attributes.

With such two-valued

(bidimensional) concepts, eight unique relationships, or
rules of combination, can be identified.

Of these eight rule

forms, four are "primary" relationships and four are their
exact compliments (Salatas

&

Bourne, 1974).

Where "A," "B"

represe~t the two relevant attribute~, the four primary
rule forms are:

conjunctive

(A_

and B); disjunctive (A or B);

conditional (if A then B); and biconditional (if A then B,
and if B then A).

The present study examines the relative

difficulty of the first three of these primary rule forms
(conjunctive, disjunctive, conditional), as a function of
the type of concept learning task, and the subjects' level
of intelligence.
Differences in the difficulty of conceptual rule
forms may be examined in several ways, depending on the information available to the subject.

In attribute identifi-

cation (AI) problems, the subject is told the rule which
defines the necessary relationship between the two important stimulus values.

The subject's task is then to

discover which two values are relevant to the concept.

In

a reception paradigm, stimuli are presented sequentially.
For each stimulus, the subject gives a yes or no category
response and is provided with immediate feedback concerning
the correct classification of the stimulus.

As the subject

gains information regarding correct classification, he will

3

eventually discover which two stimulus values are related
in the manner defined by the given rule.
In a rule learning (RL) task, the subject is told
which two stimulus values are important to the concept.

In

this case, the subject must then discover the rule which
specifies the necessary relationship between the given relevant values.

Stimulus presentation and informative feedback

follow the same procedural methodology (reception paradigm)
as that used in the attribute identification (AI) task.
As the subject gains correct classification information, it
will eventually become apparent which rule form defines the
necessary relationship between the two given relevant
stimulus values.
This study focuses on the difference in difficulty
of the bidimensional rules in both AI (attribute identification) and RL (rule learning) tasks.

One of the assump-

tions here is that the abilities necessary for successful
performance on these tasks is a function of intelligence.
In looking at the difficulty of the bidimensional rules, it
is also assumed that, as difficulty increases, the subject's
abilities will be put to greater test.

As this occurs,

performance differences between subjects of greater and
lesser abilities will increase.

Differences in bidimen-

sional rule difficulty have been revealed in numerous
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empirical investigations of both AI and RL problems.

How-

ever, the order of difficulty is not always the same between
task types.
In RL tasks, the order of difficulty among the four
primary rules has been reliably found to be, from lea.st to
most difficult: conjunctive, disjunctive, conditional, and biconditional (Bourne, 1970; Bourne & Guy, 1968a, 1968b; Neisser
& Weene, 1962; Reznick & Richman, 1976; Salatas & Bourne, 1974)

In spite of the consistency found in the order of rule
difficulty in rule learning tasks, a number of theoretical
interpretations of rule difficulty have been proposed.

Neisser

and Weene (1962), for example, proposed a system of logical
complexity for the psychological processes required by
different rules.

Their analysis placed conjunctive, disjunc-

tive, and conditional rules in the same (easiest) category.
Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956), on the other hand, have
suggested that subjects develop a strategy whereby they
focus on the attributes of a positive instance (i.e., a
member of the stimulus class concept) and compare subsequent
stimuli by varying one dimension at a time (conservative
focusing).

Bourne and Guy (1968b) examined subjects' utili-

zation of information from negative and positive instances
for conjunctive, disjunctive and conditional rules on both
RL and AI problems.

Their results indicated that subjects

may use positive and negative instances differently, depending on the type of problem and the rule.

For RL

5

tasks, subjects performed best when information from both
positive and negative instances was available.

On AI pro-

blems, performance was best when information from the
smaller, more homogeneous class of instances (positive or
negative) was available.

As the variables of class size and

homogeneity are determined by rule,. the difficulty of the
rule will increase as class size is increased and/or as
homogeneity decreases.
Bourne (1970) and Salatas and Bourne (1974) also
examined the theoretical models which attempt to account
for the differences in difficulty found for the bidimensional rules.

These various models all predict a different

order of difficulty for the four primary bidimensional
rules.

The association model, which employs a stimulus-

response logic, predicts equal difficulty of all rules.
The hierarchy of logical operations model of rule complexity
(Neisser

&

Weene, 1962) predicts conjunctive, disjunctive

and conditional rules to be equally difficult, while the
biconditional rule is more difficult.

Hovland's (1952)

model predicts conjunctive easiest, with disjunctive and
biconditional equal, followed by conditional, and then
disjunctive equal to biconditional as most difficult.

The

variability in the predictions derived from these models
fails to account for the data which consistently reveals
a conjunctive, disjunctive, conditional, biconditional

6

order of rule difficulty from least to most difficult.
Research by Bourne (1970), Salatas and Bourne (1974),
and that of Sawyer & Johnson (cited in Salatas & Bourne,
1974) in rule learning have led to the development of a
model which suggests that subjects acquire a truth table
problem solving strategy based on the classification of
stimulus values.

In bidimensional concepts, where the

class concept is defined by two stimulus values and a
combinational rule, the logical truth table consists of four
classes of events: True, True (TT); False, False (FF); True,
False (TF); and False, True (FT).

These classes represent a

factorial combination of the presence (T) or absence (F) of
the two relevant values (Salatas

&

Bourne, 1974).

In the model, it is assumed that naive subjects
approach the RL problem solving task with a bias favoring
a conjunctive rule.

Bruner, et al. (1956) have referred to

this bias as a "conjunctive set."

In developing a truth

table strategy, the subject must learn to classify stimuli
differently for each rule.

Given a conjunctive bias, the

extent to which the stimulus assignments differ from those
for a conjunctive rule determines the difficulty of the
rule.
The results of Salatas and Bourne's (1974) investigation suggest that for RL problems, subjects make fewer

7

classification errors when (a) TT instances were positive,
(b) FF instances were negative, and when (c) TF and FT
instances were in the same category as FF instances.

This

particular classification scheme suggests the operational
characteristics of a conjunctive set, in that it is facilitative only for a bidimensional conjunctive rule.

This

supports the contention that when stimuli are classified
in categories according to a different rule, some degree of
difficulty is introduced.

Salatas and Bourne (1974) cal-

culated the degree O·f rule difficulty on the basis of the
distribution of stimuli across truth table classes.

The

order of difficulty predicted by the model was supported by
the results for the four primary bidimensional rules
(Salatas

&

Bourne, 1974).

The order of rule difficulty obtained with AI tasks
is not as consistent as that found with RL problems.
Taplin (1971, 1975) has reported instances in which the
difficulty of disjunctive and conjunctive rules was reversed, and where the biconditional rule was equivalent in
difficulty to the disjunctive rule.

He pointed out, how-

ever, that differences in the obtained order of rule difficulty are not surprising given the different tasks employed.
In examining subjects' hypothesis testing on AI problems,
Taplin (1975) suggested that differences in rule difficulty
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may be a function of the processing required in confirming
or disconfirming hypotheses using positive or negative
instances.

The additional processing for negative instances

derives from transforming knowledge about what the stimulus
is no~ to what it is.

For AI problems, by virtue of the

given rule, subjects should not display as strong a conjunctive bias as in RL tasks.

It seems reasonable to assume,

however, that there could be some carry-over in terms of
processing demands involved in applying a newly learned
rule to AI tasks.

Should this be the case, such bias

should be reflected in the order of rule difficulty obtained for both RL and AI problems.
It is noteworthy that most studies involving successive rule learning have found positive inter and intrarule transfer effects (Bourne & Guy, 1968a, 1968b) and that
a reduction of differences in rule difficulty occurs
rapidly across trials (Bourne, 1970; Haygood
1965; Salatas

&

Bourne, 1974).

&

Bourne,

This suggests that subjects

acquire an effective problem solving strategy rather
quickly and that differences in rule difficulty are most
likely to be obtained with naive subjects.

Further, it

suggests that subjects may acquire the truth table problem
solving strategy at different rates.

The model proposed by

Sawyer and Johnson and expanded by Salatas and Bourne (1974)
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assumes that pre-experimental bias is influential in determining the rate at which subjects acquire a truth table
strategy for different rules.

Thus, subjects enter the ex-

perimental situation with 'different amounts of experience
with conceptual problems, and possibly with non-conjunctive
biases toward the conceptual probl·em.

This latter possi-

bility has been examined by Dominowski and Wetherick .(1976)
and Reznick and Richman (1976).

Results from both of these

studies, which used direct asses·sment of pre-experimental
bias, indicate that not all subjects exhibit an initial
conjunctive set.

In examining subjects' initial truth

table classification strategies, Reznick and Richman (1976)
report that 29 percent of the subjects receiving·one set of
relevant stimulus values, and 12 percent of the subjects
receiving another set, revealed a conjunctive bias.

Simi-

larly, Dominowski and Wetherick (1976) reJ?ort that nearly
16 percent of their subjects exhibited an initial conjunc-

tive bias.

Results of these investigations indicate that

the stimulus properties of class ·complexity (i.e., the
number of unique stimuli within each truth table class) and
frequency (i.e., the total number of stimuli in each truth
table class) may effect initial bias (Reznick

&

Richman,

1976) and transfer of learning of correct stimulus classifi-

cation within each ·truth table class (within-class transfer)

10

(Dominowski

&

Wetherick, 1976).

In both of these investi-

gations, the results indicate that initial classification
bias affects subsequent rule learning in the manner proposed

by the Sawyer and Johnson model.

However, these results

suggest an expansion of the model which would account for
non-conjunctive bias in conceptual rule learning.
This study is also concerned with the proposition
that initial rule difficulty and the acquisition of conceptual problem solving strategies may differ for subjects
of normal and superior intelligence.

In light of the

commonly referred to relationship between conceptual abilities and level of intelligence, this proposition appears to
have face validity.

Further, numerous intelligence tests

are designed in whole or in part to measure subjects' conceptual abilities.

Butcher (1968) points to the surpris-

ingly poor level of integration between the study of individual differences and the study of concept learning.

One

purpose of the present research is to examine, in an exploratory fashion, such an integration.
The experimental literature does provide some support for the proposition that intelligence and conceptual
abilities are related.

In a series of studies, Osler and

her associates (Osler & Fivel, 1961; Osler & Trautman, 1961;
Osler

&

Weiss, 1962) have investigated the role of
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individual differences and conceptual behavior.

Osler and

Fivel (1961) found that subjects with superior IQ exhibit
sudden, all or none learning consistent with an hypothesis
testing strategy.

On the other hand, normal IQ subjects

show gradual learning consistent with a continuity theory
interpretation.

Other research by Osler has revealed that

normal and superior IQ level subjects are differently
affected by the nwnber of stimulus dimensions (Osler

&

Trautman, 1961) and experimental instructions (Osler

&

Weiss, 1962).

On the basis of their results, Osler and

Trautman (1961) conclude that "the process mediating concept attainment is a function of intelligence" (p.9).

An

extension of this conclusion would suggest that the difficulty of bidimensional conceptual rules and the acquisition
of an effective problem solving strategy might also be a
function of intelligence.
A major assumption in this examination of rule difficulty is that subjects will exhibit more rapid concept
attainment where their pre-experimental bias favors the
relevant rule form (Dominowski
&

Richman, 1976).

&

Wetherick, 1976; Reznick

Thus, without assuming a conjunctive set,

and in the absence of direct assessment of pre-experimental
bias, it is assumed that conceptual bias will be revealed
in the obtained order of rule difficulty as based on the
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number of trials to criterion for each rule.

Therefore,

should differences in conceptual bias between normal and
superior IQ subjects obtain, as suggested by Osler and
Trautman (1961), these should be revealed in the order of
rule difficulty.

In this context, it is expected that for

both AI and RL tasks, performance differences between IQ
.
groups will increase as a direct function of the obtained
order of rule difficulty for each group.

Thus, performance

differences between IQ groups are expected to be greatest
on the rules found to be most difficult and smallest on
the rules found to be easiest.

This result is expected re-

gardless of whether the obtained order of rule difficulty
is the same for the two IQ groups.

Similarly, should

both IQ groups reveal the same order of rule difficulty,
it is expected that for a given rule, performance differences between the two IQ groups will increase as a function of the obtained order of difficulty.
In this study, there are 54 possible two-valued
concepts (108 possible ordered pairs for the conditional
rule).

In the AI task, the subject does not know which

two values are relevant.

In the RL task condition, there

are four possible rules, the correct one of which is
unknown to the subject.

Therefore, it is assumed that

.the processing demands in the AI task condition are
greater than those in the RL task condition.

Given this
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differential in processing demands, it is expected that
obtained differences between normal and superior IQ subjects
will be greater in the AI condition than in the RL condition
(Osler & Fivel, 1961; Osler & Trautman, 1961).

Although it

is not assumed that the AI and RL task conditions will
yield the same results, it is of interest to the present
study that the task conditions be roughly equivalent.

As

such, procedures and subject instructions are identical
until subjects are required to solve either AI or RL problems, and stimulus materials are the same in both conditions.

In this way, it is possible to attribute obtained

differences between AI and RL conditions solely to the
nature of the task or the type.of processing required by
the task (Bruner, Goodnow

&

Austin, 1956).

In assessing the acquisition of a truth table
strategy, subjects' performance is examined for each truth
table class.

As the subject learns to correctly assign

stimuli to a truth table class, errors in that class decrease and eventually no errors are made for that class of
stimuli (Bourne, 1970).

It is expected that superior IQ

subjects learn to assign stimuli to correct truth table
classes more rapidly than normal IQ subjects.

Thus, the

error rate for any given truth table class should be
greater for subjects in the normal IQ group than for those
in the superior IQ group.

Additionally, it is expected
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that the propoition of classification errors will decrease
more slowly across trials for the normal IQ group than for
the superior group, as a function of the extent to which
classification of stimuli for the relevant rule differs
from that for the preferred (i.e., pre-experimentally biased) rule.
The model of truth table classification strategy
developed by Sawyer and Johnson and expanded by Salatas
and Bourne (1974) applies to RL tasks.

This is the case

because when the subject is given the relevant stimulus
values, it is immediately apparent when the values are (T)
or are not (F) present.

In this way, it is easy for the

subject to classify stimuli on the basis of the presence
of the relevant values, particularly following a minimal
amount of practice (Bourne, 1970, 1974).

It is of interest

to the present study that the ease with which subjects
acquire this type of classification strategy for RL problems may be a function of intelligence.

It is also of

interest that this type of classification strategy may be
useful in AI problems as well.

Since subjects are

thoroughly instructed as to the nature of both AI and RL
problems, it is expected that the importance of the presence
or absence of the relevant stimulus values will be apparent
to subjects in both task conditions (Bourne

&

Guy, 1968a).
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For subjects in the AI condition, although the two relevant
values are not known, the correct classification of stimuli
will still be linked to such a truth table strategy.

Due

to the increased complexity of applying a truth table
strategy to AI problems, relative to RL problems, it is
expected that the difference in acquisition rates between
normal and superior IQ groups will increase as a function
of the task type, where as for RL problems, the difference
is lesser than for AI problems.

This is consistent with

the general proposition that AI tasks are more difficult
than RL tasks (Bourne & Guy, 1968b; Haygood & Bourne, 1965).

METHOD

Subjects
Subjects were 48 paid ($3.00/hr.) participants.
Subjects were recruited from a number of sources, primarily from summer session courses at Loyola University of
Chicago.

Subjects were 29 females and 19 males, between 18

and 34 years of age.

A total of 50 subjects participated

in the experiment, however, two normal IQ subjects were
randomly eliminated so as to yield equal numbers of normal
and superior subjects under each treatment condition.

The

average length of an experimental session was one to one
and one-half hours.
Design
A 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design with variables (a)
conceptual rule (conjunction, inclusive disjunction, conditional);

(b) task type (attribute identification [AI], rule

learning (RL]); and (c) intellectual level (normal, superior)
was employed.

Subjects were nested within IQ and task type

and were crossed with rule type.
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Materials
Assessment of intelligence.

Prior to the concept

learning phase of the experiment, all subjects were given
four of the eleven subtests comprising the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (WAIS).

The subtests used consisted

of two Verbal subtests, Similarities (S) and Vocabulary (V);
and two Performance subtests, Picture Completion (PC)
and Picture Arrangement (PA).
In selecting these four subtests, several criteria
were considered.

Due to the constraints of the proposed

design, it was necessary to evaluate intellectual level
and execute experimental manipulations in the same
session.

This precluded use of the WAIS Full Scale IQ

in differentiating subjects.

For this reason, it was

necessary to differentiate IQ on the basis of either a
shorter test or a subset of the tests given in the full
scale WAIS.

Due to the widespread use and standardization

of the WAIS, the latter choice seemed advisable.

The

relevance to conceptual behavior of the subtests used in
the present study was based on published descriptions of
the subtests by Zimmerman and Woo-Sam (1973) and Matarazzo
(1972), as well as loading on Cohen's (1957) general intelligence factor (G).
In their consideration of the S subtest, Zimmerman
and Woo-Sam (1973) describe performance on similarities as
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representing "a specific application of man's ability to
generalize, abstract, and find relationships that are not
obvious at first • • • emphasizing concept formation rather
than word difficulty • • •

[and] making implicit or

explicit use of classificatory relationships."

(P. 87,

emphasis added) •
Matarazzo (1972) describes as important in the S
subtest "the individual's ability to perceive the common
elements of the terms he is asked to compare and, at higher
levels, his ability to bring them under a single concept"
(p. 205), as well as the ability to "discriminate between
essential and superficial likenesses" (p. 207).

Cohen's

(1957) factor analysis reveals Similarities as a good
measure of G (r = 0.77).

Zimmerman and Woo-Sam (1973)

consider this correlation to reflect a capacity for verbal
concept association.
Although the V subtest does not involve abilities
clearly associated with concept formation, it is considered to be one of the best measures of G.

Cohen's (1957)

data reveal a very strong (0.83) correlation.

Zimmerman

and Woo-Sam (1973) have stated that performance on the V
subtest "indicates sensitivity to new information and ideas
and the ability to store and associatively regroup these
as the occasion demands."

They note that "by inference,

it reveals classificatory and conceptualizing skills."

19
(P. 108).

These considerations, in addition to the fact

that Vocabulary has the highest reliability of the WAIS
subtests, support the inclusion of Vin the short form for
assessment of intellectual functioning.
Cohen's (1957) analysis reveals that PC obtained
the highest loading of the WAIS performance subtests on
the general intelligence factor (r = .75).

Other major

factors associated with PC include Verbal Comprehension,
Perceptual Organization, and Freedom from Distractability
(Zimmerman and Woo-Sam, 1973).

Zimmerman and Woo-Sam also

point out as important the ability to identify the interrelationships among the various major elements of the
stimulus items.

This ability is clearly involved in

solving concept identification problems and is consistent
with Matarazzo's (1972) statement that Picture Completion
"measures the individual's basic perceptual and conceptual
abilities • • • "

(P. 210).

Matarazzo also notes the

importance of the individual's ability to differentiate
essential from non-essential details.

Although PC does not

directly measure conceptual ability, success on this subtest involves skills similar to those required in conceptual tasks.
The PA subtest involves the same skills as those
associated with PC in the identification of essential
features and relating parts to the whole.

Zimmerman and
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Woo-Sam (1973) have also noted sequential planning,
synthesis of parts, and the ability to see cause-effect
relationships as important factors in the PA subtest.
Cohen's analysis reveals a moderate (r

=

.70) correlation

with G.
In addition to the above mentioned criteria, the
reliability coefficients and standard errors of measure-.
ment (WAIS Manual, 1955) for each subtest were considered
in establishing the short form used in the present st~dy.
These figures for the Age 25-34 standardization sample
are represented on the diagonal in Table 1.
Table 1 also depicts the intercorrelation matrix
(WAIS Manual, 1955) for these four subtests and the WAIS
Full Scale IQ.

This correlation matrix was submitted to

a stepwise multiple regression analysis (Nie, Hull,
Jenkins, Steinbrenner

&

Bent, 1975) which provided weights

for predicting the WAIS Full Scale IQ:

Similarities (.20);

Vocabulary (.37); Picture Completion (.24) and Picture
Arrangement (.25),

(multiple, R

=

.90).

In order to pre-

dict IQ from the four subtests, each subject's raw scores
were converted to scaled scores, multiplied by the
obtained beta weights, and summed by Equation 1.0:

Table la
Intercorrelation of WAIS Subtests and WAIS Full Scale IQb

Subtests

Similarities

(S)

Vocabulary

(V)

Picture Completion

(PC)

Picture Arrangement

(PA)

Full Scale IQ

(FS)

Note.

s

V

PC

PA

FS

r=.85
SE=l.15

.74

.56

.52

.74

.61

.62

.82

r=.85
SE=l. 73

.57

.72

r=.60
SE=l. 73

.72

r=.95
SE=.67

r=.97
SE=2.60

Reliability coefficients (r) and standard errors of measurement
N

(SE) appear on the diagonal.
a

Adapted from the WAIS Manual, 1955, p. 13, p. 16.

bThese figures apply to the age 25-34 standardization sample.

.....
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4

Estimated IQ

=

100 + 15

]
ca (zx.1 b.)
1

(1)

i=l

Where:

zx.1

=

x.1

=

scaled score for subtest i

b.

=

regression weight from
multiple R.

1

Normal IQ level was defined as predicted scores. in
the range of 90 to 114.

The lower boundary for the normal

range follows that used by Osler and Fivel (1961).

The

upper boundary was raised above that used by Osler and
Fivel since a higher mean IQ was expected in the present
sample of college students.

Superior IQ subjects were

classified as those with.predicted IQ in excess of 115.
All materials for the assessment of intelligence
were taken from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and
the WAIS Manual.

Each of the four subtests described

above was given in their entirety as they would be in the
administration of the full scale WAIS.

The WAIS subtests

were administered by the Experimenter who has had
graduate level training and experience in administration
and scoring of the Wechsler Intelligence Scales.
concept learning materials.

Stimuli consisted

of geometric designs presented on 5" x 8" white index
cards.

These stimuli varied along four three-valued

dimensions:

Number of Figures {one, two or three);
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Color of Figures (red, blue or green); Shape of Figures
(circle, square or triangle) and Shading of Figures
(open, diagonal or cross hatched).

For each problem, a

subset of 36 of the 81 possible patterns was presented
sequentially in a predetermined order subject to the
following constraints:
1.

For each problem, stimuli equally represented

each of the four truth table classes (TT, TF, FT, and FF),
i.e., nine each;
2.

Stimuli were presented in blocks of nine, such

that the naturally occuring ratio of negative and positive
instances for the relevant rule was preserved; and
3.

The 36 stimuli were repeated twice, as

necessary, for the subject to reach the criterion of
12 consecutive correct stimulus classifications, three for
each truth table class, for problem solution.
Procedure
There were two phases in this study.

The first

phase consisted of administration of the four WAIS subtests (S, V, PA, PC) and differentiation of subjects by
level of intelligence.

In phase two, subjects were

trained in the four primary bidimensional rules.
Following training, subjects solved one problem for each
of three rules: conjunctive, disjunctive, and conditional,
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in either an AI or RL paradigm.
As a control for systematic inter-rule transfer
effects in both AI and RL conditions, the problem order
for the three conceptual rules was counter-balanced,
using six permutations of three rules in raridom rotation.
Each subject received one problem utilizing each of the
three conceptual rules.

For subjects in the RL condition,

an awareness of this procedure may have facilitated anticipation of the rule to be learned.

That is, a 33 percent

probability of any one rule on the first problem, a 50
percent probability of one of the two remaining rules on
the second problem, etc.

In order to offset this anticipa-

tion, two procedures were adapted.

First, all subjects

were instructed in one irrelevant rule (biconditional).
Second, subjects were instructed that the relevant rule
was to be determined by random selection with replacement
among the four possible rules.

Thus, the relevant rule

could have been any one of four possible rules on any
problem.

In order to increase the believability of the

random selection instruction, subjects were given four
problems.

The second in the series of four problems

utilized the same rule as the first problem in the series.
Only the first of these two problems was considered in the
analysis.
Phase one.

Subjects were informed that there
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were two phases in the experiment.

Each subject was then

given instructions pertaining to Phase 1 (see Appendix A).
Subjects were told that they would be given four
tests taken from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
It was explained that these tests would be used as a
measure of general intelligence only for purposes of comparing experimental participants, that results would be
kept confidential, and that professional ethics would not
allow the Experimenter to inform subjects of the outcomes
of these measures.

Subjects were given the four WAIS

subtests in the respective order of their administration
in the Full Scale WAIS (S, V, PC, PA).
Following the administration of the four WAIS
subtests, subjects were given a short break before the
start of Phase Two.

The Experimenter then computed

estimated IQ (see Equation 1.0) and assigned subjects to
AI and RL task conditions on an alternating basis as a
function of IQ level, so as to yield equal numbers of
normal and superior IQ level subjects under each treatment.
Phase two.

All subjects were instructed in the

principles of the concept learning tasks (see Appendix A).
The nature of the stimuli and the four primary bidimensional rules were explained and subjects were shown
examples of the stimuli which represented each value of
the four dimensions.

For their reference during the task,
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subjects were provided with a list of the four threevalued dimensions (see Appendix B) and a sheet explaining
the four primary rules (see Appendix C).

For each stimulus,

subjects were required to make a category response by
saying either "yes" or "no," indicating membership or
nonmembership in the concept class.

Subjects received

feedback from the Experimenter who indicated the correct
category response by saying either "yes, it is" or "no,
it is not."
Subjects were given practice utilizing a card
sorting procedure.

The card sorting procedure was repeated

for each rule with 12 of the 52 playing cards representing
three instances from each truth table class.

For each

rule, the sorting procedure was repeated as necessary for
subjects to correctly sort all twelve cards according to
the relevant rule and values, which were given.

Errors

were corrected and explained immediately for each stimulus.
When repetition was necessary, the relevant values were
changed·and the rule remained the same until the practice
criterion was reached.
Following the practice procedure, subjects were
instructed for either AI or RL problems (see Appendix A).
Subjects were given as much time as necessary to respond
to each stimulus card and immediate feedback was provided.
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After being given the correct response, the subject was
given five seconds to view the stimulus before the next
card was presented.
Upon completion of the four concept learning problems,. subjects were requested to indicate the extent to
which they believed ~he random rule selection instruction
on a Likert-type five point scale.

This procedure was

designed to indicate the extent to which subjects in the
Rule Learning (RL) condition may have anticipated the rule
to be learned.
At the conclusion of the experimental session,
subjects were thanked and paid for their participation.
A brief explanation of the experiment was offered and
subjects' questions were answered.

RESULTS

Pooled within group estimates of error variance
were computed separately for AI and RL task conditions.
Homogeneity of variance between task conditions was then
tested with the F statistic at the .25 level of significance.

This alpha level was set in order to avoid the type

two error of failing to reject a false null hypothesis of
homogeneity (i.e., no difference}.

Six of the 10 tests for

homogeneity of variance revealed significant differences
between the two task conditions for each of the following
dependent variables.

On reaching criterion, F (22,22}

2.938, E. < .01 and F (44,44}

=

=

3.958, E.<. .01, for subjects

within IQ and subjects x rule within IQ, respectively.
On proportion of total errors, F (22,22} = 2.048, E.< .10
and F (44,44}

=

1.373, E. <..10, for subjects within IQ and

subjects x rule within IQ, respectively.

On proportion of

errors within truth table class, F (22,22} = 2.172, E.

< .OS

and F (66,66} = 1.869, E. <. .01, for subjects within IQ and
subjects x truth table class within IQ, respectively.
The F test for homogeneity of variance failed to
28
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reach significance on the variable correct hypothesis for
both subjects within IQ and subjects x rule within IQ.
Similarly, there was a failure to reject the hypothesis
of homogeneity of variance on the proportion of errors
within truth table class for subjects x rule within IQ and
subjects x rule x truth table class within IQ.

Thus there

was no significant difference in variance between the two
task conditions on these dependent variables.

On the

whole, however, the null hypothesis of homogeneity of
variance between the AI and RL task conditions was rejected
and all subsequent analyses were performed separately for
each of the two task conditions.
Mean IQ scores and the corresponding variance was
computed for both normal and superior IQ groups in the AI
and RL task conditions.
Table 2.

These figures can be found in

The strength of association between the dependent

and independent variables was also computed.

T - tests

and computation ofw 2 (from Hays, 1973, p. 414) for each
task condition showed that a significant proportion of the
variance was accounted for by IQ level.

w2

= .6648,

while for the RL task,w 2

For the AI task,

= .7125,

showing

nearly equal amounts of variance accounted for by IQ in the
two task conditions.
In order to evaluate the extent to which subjects
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Table 2
Mean and Variance of IQ
for Normal and Superior Subjects

IQ Level

Mean

Variance

Superior
AI Task

122.1

24.41

Task

120.3

17.39

AI Task

108.3

25.72

Task

107.5

15.08

RL

Normal

RL
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believed the random rule selection instruction, subjects'
confidence ratings were examined.

The mean confidence

level on a five point Likert-type scale was 4.79, indicating
a very high level of confidence in the veridicality of this
instruction.
Due to the constraints placed on the stimulus set,
for the conditional rule, it was possible for the subjects
in the AI task condition to formulate an hypothesis which
could not be disconfirmed.

For subjects under this treat-

ment condition, when an incorrect hypothesis was stated,
the stimulus set was examined for possible disconfirmation.
When the stated hypothesis could not be disconfirmed, the
subject was given credit for the correct hypothesis •

Of

17 subjects giving an incorrect hypothesis under the AI
conditional rule treatment condition, five subjects stated
hypotheses which could not be disconfirmed.

For purposes

of this analysis, those five subjects were treated as
having stated the correct hypothesis.
Attribute Identification
A 2 (IQ level) x 3 (conceptual rule) analysis of
variance was computed for the AI (Attribute Identification)
task.

The dependent variables for this analysis were:

(a) the proportion of total errors to total responses;
(b) statement of the correct hypothesis; and (c) reaching
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the criterion of 12 consecutive correct responses within
the maximum of 72 trials.
this ANOVA.

Table 3 presents a summary of

Part (i) contains the summary for the

dependent variable of reaching criterion.

Parts (ii) and

(iii) present the summary for correct hypothesis and proportion of errors, respectively.

For this task condition, the

analysis revealed a main effect of conceptual rule on all
three dependent measures.

F (2,44)

=

12.8701, E,< .01,

F (2,44) = 14.3257, E.< .01, F (2,44) = 13.5539, E.< .01, for
criterion, hypothesis, and errors, respectively.

Table 4

shows the mean percentage of subjects failing to reach criterion as a function of conceptual rule.

Table 5 shows the

mean percentage of subjects failing to state the correct
hypothesis as a function of conceptual rule and IQ level,
and Table 6 shows the mean proportion of errors to total
responses as a function of conceptual rule and IQ level.
The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction
of rule and IQ level on subjects' statements of the correct
hypothesis in the AI task.

F (2,44)

=

3.5814, E,<.. .OS.

The figures in the matrix of Table 5 represent the percentage of subjects failing to state the correct hypothesis
as a function of the IQ level, conceptual rule interaction.
For both normal and superior IQ levels, the order of rule
difficulty was the same (in order of descending difficulty):

Table 3
Attribute Identification Task
2(IQ Level)

X

3(Conceptual Rule) ANOVA Summary

ss

Source

df

MS

F

1

.001389

.1209

2.53

22

.11489

2.25

2

Part ( i) :

Criterion

Between
IQ

.001389

Subjects (IQ)
Within
Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)

.5278
5.56
Part (ii) :

1.625

2

.26389

44

.12626

12.8701**
2.09

Hypothesis

Between
IQ

.00556

Subjects (IQ)

3.722

1

.00556

22

.16919

.3284

Within .
Rule
IQ

X

3.11
Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)

.7778
4.778

2
2
44

1.56
.3889
.10858

14.3257**
3.5814*

w
w

Table 3, cont.

ss

Source

df

MS

F

.8888

.0064

Part (iii) : . Errors.
Between

IQ

.8888

Subjects (IQ)

1

3079.04

22

139.96

1912.11

2

956.06

13.5539**

448.11

2

224.06

3.1764

.3103. 64

.44

70.54

Within
Rule

IQ

Rule

X

Subjects x Rule (IQ)
**

p

< .01

*

p

< .05
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Table 4
Mean Percentage of Subjects Failing to Reach
Criterion in the AI Task*

Conceptual Rule

Conjunctive
00

Disjunctive

Conditional

12.5

*These figures are based on n

=

50

24 subjects
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Table 5
Mean Percentage of Subjects Failing to State
the Correct Hypothesis in the AI Task

Conceptual Rule
IQ Level

Conjunctive

Disjunctive

Conditional

Normal

0

33

42

Superior

0

0

58

0

17

50

Note.

The marginal column totals represent the means

for the main effect of rule.

The figures within the matrix

represent the Rule x IQ interaction.
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Table 6
Mean Proportion of Errors to Total Responses
for the AI Task Condition

Conceptual Rule
IQ Level

Conjunctive

Disjunctive

Conditional

Normal

22.33

23.08

28.33

I

24.58

Superior

18.67

19.25

35.17

I

24.36

20.50

21.16

31.75

~-

These figures represent the mean proportion of

errors x 100.
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conditional, disjunctive, and conjunctive.
In order to examine the differences between the
rules which contributed to the significant overall main
effect of rule on the dependent measure of reaching
criterion (see Table 4), a Newman-Keuls test was performed.
Utilizing the q

r statistic (see Winer, 1971), this test

revealed significant differences between the conditional
rule and each of the other rules {i.e., conjunctive and
disjunctive).

{2,44)

=

.2066,

SB q_ 95 {3,44) = .2487, E< .OS; and SB q_ 95

E<

.OS, for the difference between conjunc-

tive and conditional; and disjunctive and conditional,
respectively.
An analysis of simple main effects on the interaction of IQ level and rule on the dependent measure of
stating the correct hypothesis {see Table 4) was performed.
This analysis revealed a significant effect of rule on both
IQ groups.

F (2,44) = 5.374,

jects, and F {2,44)
subjects.

=

E<

.01, for normal IQ sub-

12.534, E<-01, for superior IQ

This simple main effects analysis also showed

a significant effect of IQ on the disjunctive rule, F

(1,63)

=

5.125,

e<-OS.

The simple main effect of IQ on

the conjunctive and conditional rules was not significant.
A Newman-Keuls test on the differences between
rules for the mean proportion of total errors revealed
relationships similar to those found on the criterion
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measure (see Table 6).

For the difference between condi-

tional and conjunctive rules,

SB

(3,44) = 5.880,
95
E <.OS; and for the difference between conditional and dis-

SB

q_

(2,44) = 4.886, E< .OS.
95
A contrast on the mean proportion of total errors

junctive rules,

q_

also revealed a significant difference between the conjunctive-disjunctive rule pair and the conditional rule, F
(1,69)

=

27.02, E<-00l.

The difference between the con-

junctive and disjunctive rules was not significant.
In order to examine the proportion of errors to
total responses within each truth table class, a 2(IQ
level) x 3(conceptual rule) x 4(truth table class) analysis
of variance was performed for the AI task condition.
7 represents this ANOVA in summary form.

Table

This analysis

showed a main effect of conceptual rule, F (2,44)

=

12.9437, £(.01, with rules ordered conjunctive, disjunctive
and conditional, respectively, from least to most difficult.
This analysis also revealed significant interactions in the
AI task condition for conceptual rule and IQ level, F
(2,44)

=

3.2788, E(.05, and between conceptual rule and

truth table class, F (6,132)

=

7.1484, E<-01.

Table 8

represents the proportion of errors to total responses,
summed across truth table class, as a function of rule and
IQ level.

Table 9 shows the proportion of errors to

Table 7
Attribute Identification Task
2(IQ Level) x 3(Conceptual Rule) x 4(Truth Table Class) ANOVA
Summary for Truth Table Class Errors

ss

Source

df

MS

F

Between
IQ

10.125

Subjects (IQ)

1

10.125

0.0182

12240.44

22

556.38

7299.52

2

3649.76

12.9437**

1849.08

2

924.54

3.2788*

12406.75

44

281.97

2106.24

3

702.08

1. 8110

597.90

3

199.30

0.5141

Subjects x Class (IQ)

25587.04

66

387.68

Rule x Class

12691.80

6

2115.30

IQ x Rule x Class

258.10

6

43.02

Subjects x R11le x
Class (IQ)

39060.23

132

295.91

Within
Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)
Class
IQ x Class

** p<. 01
*

0 <.05

7.1484**
0.1454
.r:,.
0
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Table 8
Mean Proportion of Errors to Total Responses
for Subjects in the AI Task Condition
Conceptual Rul.e
IQ Level

Conjunctive

D.i.sjunctive

Conditional

Normal

22.90

23.21

28.35

I

24.82

Superior

18.98

19·.21

35 .15

I

24.45

20.94

.2.1.2.1

.31.75

Note.
x 100.

These figures represent the the mean {proportions)

The marginal column totals represent the means for the

main effect of rule, while the means within the factorial
matrix represent rule by IQ interaction.
summed across truth table class.

These figures are
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Table 9
Mean Proportion of Errors to Total Responses
As a Function of Truth Table Class and Rule in the AI Task

Truth Table Class

FF

TT

TF

Conjunctive

22.92

21.92

30.25

8.67

Disjunctive

7.79

20.96

27.21

28.88

Conditional

32.29

38.58

24.50

31.62

Rule

Note.

FT

Figures represent means (proportions)

X

100.
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total responses within each truth table class as a function of conceptual rule summed across IQ levels.
An additional 2(IQ level) x 3(conceptual rule)

analysis of variance was performed for the AI task condition
using the number of trials to criterion as the dependent
measure.

For purposes of this analysis, subjects failing

to reach criterion within 72 trials were assigned the
maximum score of 72 trials.

Results of this analysis in-

dicate a significant main effect of IQ, F (1,22) = 5.07,

£

<.05,

and rule, F (2,44) = 15. 75, £

trials to criterion.

<.05,

on number of

Table 10 presents a summary of this

ANOVA, while Table 11 shows the mean number of trials to
criterion as a function of IQ and conceptual rule.
A Newman-Keuls test revealed a significant difference between superior and normal IQ groups,
9.487, E<-05; and between all rule pairs,
9.798, E<-05

SA

q_

95

(2,22) =

SB q_ 95 (2,44)

for the difference between the conjunctive-

disjunctive and disjunctive-conditional rule pairs, and

SB q_ 95 (3,44) = 11. 792, E ( .05 for the differ.ence between
the conjunctive and conditional rules.
Rule Learning
A 2(IQ level) x 3(conceptual rule) analysis of
variance was computed for the RL task condition.

As in

the AI task, the dependent variables for this analysis

=

Table 10
Attribute Identification Task
2(IQ Level) x 3(Conceptual Rule) ANOVA
Summary for Number of Trials to Criterion

Source
Between

ss

df

10151.5

23

441. 37

1
22

1901.39

48

460.21

8937.58

2

4468.79

668.36

2

334.18

12484.06

44

283.73

IQ

1901. 39

Subjects (IQ)

8250.11

Within

22090.0

Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)
Total
** p
* p

MS

F

5.07*

375.00
15.75**
1.18

71

<. 01

< .05
~

~
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Table 11
Mean Number of Trials to Criterion
As a Function of IQ Level and Rule in the AI Task

Conceptual Rule
IQ Level

Conjunctive

Disjunctive

Conditional

Normal

33.25

47.08

53.33

I

45.56

Superior

22.67

29.50

53.67

I

35.28

27.96

38.29

55.00

Note.

Subjects failing to reach criterion were assigned

a maximum of 72 trials.

The marginal column totals repre-

sent the means for the main effect of rule, while the
marginal row totals represent the means for the main effect
of IQ level.
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were:

(a) subjects reaching criterion of 12 consecutive

correct responses within a maximum of 72 trials;

(b) sub-

jects' statement of the correct hypothesis; and (c) proportion of errors to total responses.

A summary of the ANOVA

for each of these dependent measures is represented in
Parts (i),

(ii) and (iii) of Table 12.

For the RL task condition, the 2 x 3 ANOVA revealed
a significant main effect of conceptual rule on statement
of correct hypothesis, F (2,44) = 8.8847, E<-0l, and
proportion of total errors, F (2,44)

=

15.2778, E< .01.

Table 13 shows the percentage of subjects failing to state
the correct hypothesis as a function of conceptual rule
and IQ level.

Table 14 shows the mean proportion of errors

to total responses as a function of conceptual rule and IQ
level.
A Newman-Keuls test on the statement of correct
hypothesis showed significant differences on all possible
ordered comparisons of rule pairs (see Table 13).

For

conjunctive-disjunctive and conjunctive-conditional pairs,
SB q_ 95 (2,44)

=

comparison, SB q_

.05757.
95

(3,44)

For the disjunctive-conditional

=

.069286.

Similarly, a

Newman-Keuls test revealed significant differences in total
errors '(see Table 14) between the disjunctive and conditional rules, SB q_ 95 (2,44) = 4.161.
In order to examine the proportion of errors within

Table 12
Rule Learning Task
2(IQ Level) x 3(Conceptual Rule) ANOVA Summary

ss

Source

df

Part (i) :

MS

F

Criterion

Between
IQ

.001389

1

.001389

Subjects (IQ)

0.3548

.8611

22

.003914

.2500

2

.12500

3.1936

.00278

2

.001389

0.3548

44

.003914

Within
Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)

1.722
Part (ii) :

Hypothesis

Between
IQ
Subjects (IQ)

.500

1

2.833

22

.500

3.8824

.12878
,r:,..

Within

-.J

Rule
IQ

X

1.75
Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)

.5833
4.333

2

.8750

8.8847**

2

.29167

2.9616

44

.009848

Table 12, cont.

ss

Source

Part ( iii) :

df.

MS

F

Errors

Between
IQ
Subjects (IQ)

1. 7955

122.72

1

122.72

1503.71

22

68.35

1569.361

2

784.68

15.2778**

232.03

2

116.01

2.2588

.2259.88

. 44

51.36

Within
Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects
** p ( . 01

X

Rule (IQ)
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Table 13
Mean Percentage of Subjects Failing to State
the Correct Hypothesis in the RL Task
Conceptual Rule
IQ Level
Normal
Superior

Note.

Conjunctiv.e.

D.i s j uncti ve

Conditional

17

0

58

8

0

17

12 • .5

0

37.5

The marginal column totals represent the means

for the main effect of rule
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Table 14
Mean Proportion of Errors to Total Responses
for Subjects in the RL Task Condition

Conceptual Rule
IQ Level

Conjunctive

Disjunctive

Conditional

Normal

10.08

11.50

21.50

Superior

12.42

5.42

17.42

11.25

8.46

19.46

Note.

These figures represent the proportion of

errors x 100.
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each truth table class in the RL task condition, a 2{IQ
level) x 3(conceptual rule) x 4(truth table class)
analysis of variance was computed.
ANOVA is presented in Table 15.

A summary of this

This analysis revealed

significant main effects of conceptual rule, F (2,44) =
14.1362, E< .01, and truth table class, F (3,66) = 19.3972,

E

< . 01.
Part (i) of Table 16 shows the mean proportion of

errors within each truth table class summed across conceptual rule and IQ level.

As can be seen in Part (i)

of Table 16, subjects made the fewest number of errors in
TT instances with errors increasing respectively for FF,
TF and FT instances.

Part (ii) of Table 16 shows the mean

proportion of errors for each rule summed across truth
table and IQ level.
No significant two-way interactions were revealed
in the RL task condition.

However,the three-way (IQ x

Rule x Truth Table Class) interaction was significant,
F (6,132) = 2.2965, E(.05.

Part (iii) of Table 16 shows

the proportion of errors within each truth table class as
a function of conceptual rule for the normal IQ group,
while Part (iv) of Table 16 presents those figures for the
superior IQ group.
In order to examine-which differences contributed
to the significant IQ x Rule x Truth Table Class interaction

Table 15
Rule Learning Task
2(IQ Level) x 3(Conceptual Rule) x 4(Truth Table Class) ANOVA
Summary for Truth Table Class Errors

ss

Source

df

MS

F

Between
555.55

1

555.55

5636.39

22

256.19

6317.92

2

3158.96

940.33

2

470.17

9832.50

44

223.47

12070.57

3

4023.52

575.47

3

191.82

13690.21

66

207.43

Rule x Class

1648.82

6

274.80

0.9806

IQ x Rule x Class

3861.44

6

643.57

2.2965*

Subjects x Rule x
Class (IQ)

36992.40

IQ

Subjects (IQ)

2.1684

Within
Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)
Class
IQ x Class
Subjects x Class (IQ)

** p

<. 01

* P<

.05

132

14.1362**
2.1040
19.3972**
0.9248

280.25
U1

"'

Table 16
Mean Proportion of Errors to Total Responses Within Truth Table Class
for Subjects in the RL Task Condition

Part (i):
Truth Table Class
Errors

Part (ii):
Rule
Errors

Errors Summed Across Rules

&

IQ Level

TT

TF

FT

FF

3.85

18.53

20.08

11.07

Errors Summed Across Truth Table Class

&

Conjunctive

Disjunctive

11.58

8.76

IQ Level
Conditional
19.80
lJ1

w

Table 16, cont.

Part ( iii) :

Errors for Normal IQ
Truth Table Class

Rule

TT

TF

FT

FF

Conjunctive

4.50

19.67

11.58

6.33

Disjunctive

3.08

20.67

18.00

6.25

Conditional

7.83

21.83

39.42

18.08

5.14

20.72

23.00

10.22

Part (iv):

Errors for su12erior IQ
Truth Table Class

Rule

TT

TF

FT

FF

Conjunctive

4.42

10.67

20.25

10.25

Disjunctive

o.oo

11.75

7.58

2.75

Conditional

3.25

26.58

18.67

22.75

2.56

16.33

17.17

Note.

These figures represent the proportion of errors x 100.

11.92
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revealed by this ANOVA, differences between truth table
classes for each rule and differences between the rules for
each truth table class were computed.

These differences

were computed separately for the two IQ levels.
For individual comparisons within subjects, the
following correlated t formula may be used:

t -

( 2)

V(MS Rx TT x S(I) x 16

Where:
R

=

Conceptual Rule

TT

=

Truth Table Class

S(I)

=

Subjects within IQ level

Data for the correlated t computations are found in
Parts (iii) and (iv) of Table 16.

Using a two tailed test

of significance, with alpha= .05, significant differences
for normal IQ subjects were found for: the FT truth table
class, conjunctive-conditional and disjunctive-conditional;
for the conjunctive rule, TT - TF; for the disjunctive
rule, TT - TF, TT - FT, TF - FF; and for the conditional
rule, TT - TF, TT - FT, TF - FT, and FT - FF.

All other

comparisons for the normal IQ group were not significant.
For superior IQ subjects, significant differences
were found for: the TF truth table class, conjunctiveconditional, disjunctive-conditional, and for the FF class,
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disjunctive-conditional; for the conjunctive rule, TT - TF,
TT - FT, and TT - FF.

All other comparisons for the

superior IQ group failed to reach significance.
An additional 2 (IQ level) x 3 (conceptual rule)
analysis of variance was performed on the dependent variable
number of trials to criterion.
summary of this ANOVA.

Table 17 presents the

As was the case in the AI task

condition, subjects failing to reach criterion were assigned
the maximum of 72 trials for purposes of this analysis.
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of IQ level,
F (1,22)

=

9.06, E<-01, and a main effect of rule type,

F (2,44) = 25,78, 2<.0l.

There was also a significant

IQ x rule interaction, F (2,44) = 7.66, E<·0l.

The mean

number of trials to criterion as a function of IQ level
and rule type are presented in Table 18.

The figures in

Table 18 represent both the main effects and, within the
matrix, their interaction.
A simple main effects analysis on the number of
trials to criterion revealed a significant effect of rule
type for normal IQ subjects, F (2,44) = 29.48, £< .01;
and for superior IQ subjects, F (2,44)

=

3.95, £ ,.05.

The

simple main effect of IQ level was significant only for the
conditional rule, F (1,66) = 23.20, £<._.01.

Table 17
Rule Learning Task
2(IQ Level) x 3(Conceptual Rule) ANOVA ·
Summary for Number of Trials to Criterion

ss

Source
Between

df

MS

F

3626.61

23

IQ

1058.00

1

Subjects (IQ)

2568.61

22

116.76

14658.67

48

305.39

6815.20

2

3407.60

25.78**

2025.58

2

1012.79

7.66**

5817.89

44

132.22

Within
Rule
IQ

X

Rule

Subjects x Rule (IQ)
Total
** p

157.68
1058.0

9.06**

71

<. 01
U1

-..J
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Table 18
Mean Number of Trials to Criterion
As a Function of IQ Level and Rule Type in the RL Task

Conceptual Rule
IQ Level

Conjunctive

Disjunctive

Conditional

Normal

17.5

16.75

48.33

I 27.53

Superior

20.42

13.00

26.17

I 19.86

18.96

14.875

37.25

Note.

Marginal column totals represent means for the

main effect of rule type, while marginal row totals are
means for the main effect of IQ level.

Figures within the

matrix represent the IQ by Rule interaction.

DISCUSSION
Bidimensional rule difficulty varied as a function
of the type of rule (conjunctive, disjunctive or conditional)
for almost all dependent measures in this study.

The one

exception to this effect was the criterion measure in the
RL task condition.

For that variable, the mean number of

subjects failing to reach criterion was equivalent for the
conjunctive and disjunctive rules and only slightly greater
for the conditional rule.

Aside from this exception, each

dependent measure in both the AI and RL task conditions
showed a significant main effect of conceptual rule type.
As revealed in several post hoc analyses, the main
effect of rule was invariably due to the difficulty experienced by subjects in working with the conditional rule.

In

some cases, differences between the conjunctive and disjunctive rules also contributed to this effect.

The difficulty

of the conditional rule was consistent for both the AI and
RL tasks.
In the AI task, the conjunctive rule was always
either easiest or equal in difficulty to the disjunctive
rule.

In the RL task, this order was reversed, with the
59
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disjunctive rule always easiest or equivalent to the conjunctive rule.

In other words, the obtained order of rule

difficulty was consistent with each task type on all dependent measures.

For the AI task, the rules were ordered,

from easiest to most difficult: conjunctive, disjunctive,
conditional.

For the RL task, this respective order of dif-

ficulty was disjunctive, conjunctive, conditional.
Predictions made by use of the Sawyer and Johnson
inference model of rule learning were generally supported
by the results of the present study.

Assuming that subjects

approach the task with a pre-experimental bias favoring a
conditional rule, the model predicts that subjects will perform best on the conjunctive rule, followed by the disjunctive rule, and then the conditional rule.

In the AI task

condition, this ordering of the rules was clearly evident.
For the RL task condition, this predicted order was partially
revealed in that the conditional rule was most difficult.
The conjunctive - disjunctive order was reversed, however.
In as much as the quantification of the inference
model is somewhat arbitrary (Salatas

&

Bourne, 1974), it

could be argued that the expected differences between rules
which ·are adjacent in difficulty might be negligible, while
comparisons with non-adjacent rules are likely to be significant.

Therefore, non-significant differences might be
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expected between the conjunctive and disjunctive rules.
Further, these differences might reveal either ordering of
the rules found in the present study.
Salatas and Bourne (1974) have expanded the SawyerJohnson model to include the compliments to the four primary
bidimensional rules.

When all eight rules are included in

predictions of rule difficulty, the conjunctive and disjunctive rules are respectively ordered easiest and next to
easiest, while the conditional and biconditional rules are
next to most difficult and most difficult, respectively.
Given the quantification of the model imposed by Salatas
and Bourne (1974), the conditional rule is several steps
removed from both the conjunctive and disjunctive rules.
According to the logic developed here, the present study
provides support for the Sawyer-Johnson model in both the
AI and RL tasks.
For the most part, the results of the present study
are consistent with the Sawyer-Johnson model.

However,

some difficulty remains in accounting for the reversal of
conjunctive and disjunctive rule difficulty in the RL task
with this model.

It seems that a major source of difficulty

in reconciling the present results with predictions from the
Sawyer-Johnson model lies in the assumption that subjects
approach the· conceptual tasks with a conjunctive bias.

In
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examining subjects' initial classification strategies,
Dominowski and Wetherick {1976) found that about 58 percent
of their subjects were· using a strategy consistent with a
disjunctive rule, while approximately 16 percent used a
conjunctive strategy.

Although they only examined a condi-

tional rule and a negation rule, the results reported by
Dominowski and Wetherick {1976) are significant to the present results in that they show that subjects may approach
a rule learning task with a non-conjunctive bias.
In exploring a multibased expansion of the SawyerJohnson model, Reznick and Richman {1976) provide additional
evidence that not all subjects have a conjunctive bias.
Their research also shows that while the ordinal position of
conjunctive and disjunctive rule difficulty reflects the
subjects' bias, conditional rule difficulty is stable regardless of the pre-experimental bias of the subject.

More

important, in attempting to explain the reversal of conjunctive and disjunctive rule difficulty found between the
AI and RL tasks in the present study, is Reznick and
Richman's {1976) finding that subjects' pre-experimental
bias may be affected by stimulus variables {such as the
value of the relevant attributes), and that rule difficulty
is easily altered by truth table class frequency and complexity.

Given this lack of stability, and by extension of

this finding, it seems likely that the present results
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reflect the sensitivity of subjects' initial bias to the
demands of a particular task.

In the present study, the AI

task promoted a conjunctive bias, while the RL task elicited
a disjunctive bias.

This finding is also consistent with

Taplin's (1975) suggestion, and the results obtained by
Bourne and Guy (1968b) which indicate that rule difficulty
is readily influenced by the processing demands of the particular conceptual task.
overall, this study failed to reveal significant
differences between the two IQ groups.

Generally, however,

in both AI and RL task conditions, superior IQ subjects revealed better performance than did normal IQ subjects on
every dependent measure in the study.

Differences between

the two groups were negligible in both task conditions except for number of trials to criterion, where superior IQ
subjects performed significantly better than did the normal
IQ groups on both AI and RL tasks (see Tables 11 and 18).
It was suggested that there might be differences between normal and superior IQ groups on pre-experimental
bias.

There was no evidence in the present study to provide

support for this suggestion in either task condition.

The

order of rule difficulty was the same for IQ groups on all
de:Eendent measures.
One of the major areas of focus in the present study
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was performance differences between IQ groups as a £unction
of rule difficulty.

The expectation that differences be-

tween IQ levels would increase as rule difficulty increased
was supported in the RL task condition, where subjects in
the superior IQ group showed significantly fewer trials to
criterion than normal IQ subjects on the conditional rule
(see Table 18).
Although there were no other significant effects of
IQ in the RL task, the data on statement of the correct
hypothesis were in the expected direction (see Table 13).
On the disjunctive rule (easiest), there were no differences
between IQ groups.

For the conjunctive rule (next to

easiest), a slight difference favoring the superior IQ group
was obtained.

On the conditional rule (most difficult), the

differences favoring the superior IQ group were even greater.
Results in the AI task run counter to the prediction
that differences between IQ groups will increase as a function of rule difficulty.

For proportion of errors to total

responses, collapsed across truth table class, the IQ level
by rule interaction shows fewer errors for the normal IQ
group than for the superior IQ group on the conditional
rule (see Table 8}.
A similar result was obtained for statement of the

correct hypothesis on the conditional rule in the AI task
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(see Table 5).

For this dependent measure, subjects in·both

IQ groups stated the correct hypothesis for the conjunctive
rule.

For the disjunctive rule, all superior IQ subjects

stated the correct hypothesis, while 33 percent of the
normal IQ subjects in this condition failed to state the
correct hypothesis.

For the conditional rule, 58 percent of

the subjects in the superior IQ group and 42 percent of the
normal IQ subjects failed to state the correct hypothesis.
As mentioned above, this result is responsible for the IQ
by rule interaction on this measure.

However, the simple

main effects analysis shows that the significant difference
between IQ groups was on the conjunctive rule, not the conditional rule, and this difference is in the predicted direction.
In the AI task, the crossover between normal and
superior IQ groups on proportion of errors is not as easily
dismissed as is the crossover on statement of the correct
hypothesis.

For proportion of errors, the greatest differ-

ence between IQ groups is evidenced on the conditional rule,
where subjects in the normal IQ group performed better than
superior IQ subjects.

Why this is the case is not readily

ascertained from the data.

One subject in the normal IQ

group did not make any errors in this treatment condition,
but this does not account for the crossover.

An examination

of truth table class errors reveals no major differences
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between IQ groups which would help explain this result.· It
remains for further research to examine this particular
condition before some explanation is to be found.
The present study also examined truth table classification strategies between IQ groups in both AI and RL
tasks.

Based on analysis of errors within truth table

classes, this effect is consistent with the Sawyer-Johnson
model of rule difficulty and truth table problem solving
strategy, in that TT and FF instances were both easier than
TF and FT instances (see Table 16).

This result was con-

sistent for both IQ groups.
It was expected that superior IQ subjects would acquire a truth table problem solving strategy more rapidly
than normal IQ subjects and that this would be evident in
different error rates within truth table classes for the
two IQ groups.

This expectation was not confirmed, although

it was not contradicted in the present study.

That is, the

results were generally in the predicted direction in the RL
task.

Additionally, superior IQ subjects revealed fewer

significant differences in error rates between the truth
table classes than did normal IQ subjects.

This means that,

as truth table classification became more difficult, the
normal IQ gr0up did not perform as well as the superior IQ
group.
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between IQ groups which would help explain this result.· It
remains for further research to examine this particular
condition before some explanation is to be found.
The present study also examined truth table classification strategies between IQ groups in both AI and RL
tasks.

Based on analysis of errors within truth table

classes, this effect is consistent with the Sawyer-Johnson
model of rule difficulty and truth table problem solving
strategy, in that TT and FF instances were both easier than
TF and FT instances (see Table 16).

This result was con-

sistent for both IQ groups.
It was expected that superior IQ subjects would acquire a truth table problem solving strategy more rapidly
than normal IQ subjects and that this would be evident in
different error rates within truth table classes for the
two IQ groups.

This expectation was not confirmed, although

it was not contradicted in the present study.

That is, the

results were generally in the predicted direction in the RL
task.

Additionally, superior IQ subjects revealed fewer

significant differences in error rates between the truth
table classes than did normal IQ subjects.

This means that,

as truth table classification became more difficult, the
normal IQ group did not perform as well as the superior IQ
group.
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In general, for the RL task, the present results
for truth table class errors are consistent with previous
findings.

Dominowski and Wetherick (1976) predicted that

TT and FF classes should be easier than TF and FT classes,
given their results in examining classification bias.

The

results of the present study provide support for this prediction for both IQ

levels and all three rules.

task condition, no such regularity was obtained.

In the AI
This is

reflected in the lack of a significant main effect of truth
table class, which argues against the proposition that subjects may acquire a truth table problem solving strategy

in AI tasks.

If an extension of the truth table problem

solving model was appropriate for AI tasks, it would be expected that error rates for TT stimuli would be the same or
similar for all three rules since they are like (i.e., all
positive) instances.

Also, for FF stimuli, error rates

should be similar for the conjunctive and disjunctive rules
(where FF instances are negative) and greater for the conditional rule, where FF stimuli are positive.

As Table 9

clearly shows, however, this result was not obtained in the
present study •
. The present re.sul ts for the AI task do not conform
to predictions from any model which examines the effects of
subiects' classification bias and problem solvinq strategy.
Although future research may shed some light on this, at
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present, it can only be concluded that there is no evidence
supporting the suggestion that subjects may acquire a consistent truth table problem solving strategy in attribute
identification tasks.

At the very least, this study sug-

gests that the quantification of the Sawyer-Johnson model
for rule difficulty and truth table strategy cannot be extended to AI problems.

This holds for the model as ex-

panded by Salatas and Bourne (1974) and for the multibiased
modifications suggested by Reznick and Richman (1976).
Reject.ion of the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance between AI and RL task conditions indicates that there
are significant differences between the two types of task.
This supports previous contentions that the processing required by AI and RL tasks is not the same (Bruner, et al.,
1956; Salatas

&

Bourne, 1974; Taplin, 1975).

Regardless of

differences in processing demands between AI and RL tasks,
the conditional rule form is consistently more difficult than
either the conjunctive or the disjunctive rules.

This latter

conclusion is supported by the difficulty experienced by all
subjects in the present study during the training phrase of
the experiment.

Whereas all subjects were able to respond

correctly in the card sorting task for the conjunctive and
disjunctive rules, the conditional rule presented considerable difficulty for all subjects.

69

In light of these findings, it seems that although
the Sawyer-Johnson model may account for rule difficulty in
both AI and RL tasks, separate models may be required to
explain subjects' problem solving strategies in the two
types of tasks.

Truth table responses may not be an appro-

priate dependent measure for AI tasks.

On the other hand,

the consistent ordering of rule difficulty for all dependent
measures within each type of task indicates a close relationship between subjects' statement of hypotheses, error
rates, and nmnber of trials required to reach criterion for
learning both AI and RL tasks.
One of the major foci of the present study was the
relative performance of the two IQ groups.

In general, pre-

dictions regarding differences between normal and superior
IQ subjects were not contradicted in the present study.

At

the same time, however, the IQ factor was not revealed as
significant a variable as was expected.

There are several

possible reasons for this apparent lack of difference between normal and superior IQ.
It is possible that the small nmnber of subjects in
each cell (n = 12) failed to produce reliable differences of
a great enough magnitude to be detected in the present study.
'l'he small but fairly.. consistent differences observed between
IQ levels lends some .support to this interpretation.

Along
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similar lines, it is possible that the small sample used in
this study was a fairly homogeneous group.

This would have

the effect of reducing the reliability of predicting differences between subjects assigned to the two groups {Anastasi,
1976) •
Given the type of design used in the present study,
another possible explanation of the lack of a significant
main effect of IQ is provided by Winer {1971).

He points

out that the main effect of IQ is confounded with differences between groups of subjects nested under the IQ
factor.

The effect of this confounding is to lower the

sensitivity of the test due to a greater number of uncontrolled sources of error variance.

Winer {1971) also notes

that when there is a positive and constant correlation between pairs of measurements, the error term for the between
subjects variable will be greater than that for within
subject variables.
In the present study, there is some evidence of such
a positive and constant correlation between the IQ factor
and spurious differences between groups not due to IQ per se.
This correlation is seen in the consistency with which the
error terms for the between subjects variable is greater
than for the within subjects variable.

Although this

does not mitigate entirely the lack of significant main
effects for IQ level, it does argue for further consideration
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of the IQ variable in studies of conceptual learning.

The

suggestion here is that future research should employ an
alternate design which would include a covariate which
would statistically absorb a portion of the variance in the
between subjects error term (Winer, 1971}.
One additional explanation for the lack of a significant IQ effect is the possibility that the training procedure may have reduced the differences between IQ groups.

It

was previously mentioned that subjects had some difficulty
in learning to respond successfully on the card sorting
task.

During that phase of the experiment, subjects had

particular difficulty with the conditional rule.

Bourne

and Guy (1968a) have observed strong transfer effects,
partic~larly when subjects are trained with a conditional
rule which focuses on responding to TF and FT stimuli and on
classifying FF instances as positive.

Furthermore, training,

even without such a focus, may result in changes in strategy
from those of the naive subject (Bourne, 1970; Bruner, et
al., 1956).

In light of this possibility, when training pro-

cedures are used, it might be fruitful in future research to
examine group differences in the number of practice trials
necessary for basic understanding of the various rules.
This study has examined the role of individual
differences in conceptual behavior and problem solving.

72

Although the magnitude of the IQ group differences was often
not statistically significant, general support for the existence of IQ group differences in conceptual behavior has
been provided.

At the very least, this study argues for

continued investigation in the area.

Consistent differences

between the conditional rule and the conjunctive and disjunctive rules have been found in both AI and RL tasks.
Support was also found for the acquisition of a truth table
problem solving strategy for both IQ groups in the RL task,
although this type of problem solving strategy was not evidenced in the AI task.
Lastly, this study also shows that it is both possible and desirable to examine the relation of IQ and the
conceptual abilities with which it is typically associated.
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APPENDIX A

Instructions
Phase One
"There will be two parts in this experiment. In
the first part, you will be given four tests which are
taken from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Performance on these tests will be used as a measure of general
intelligence, for purposes of comparing groups of subjects
who will be participating in this experiment. The results
from these tests will not be used for any other purpose
and you cannot be identified individually. Professional
ethics prevent the Experimenter from revealing the results
of these measures and you will not be given any information on this phase of the experiment. Do you have any
questions?
Phase Two
In the second part of this experiment, you will be
asked to solve several problems. In solving these problems, it will be necessary for you to form and use concepts. A concept is an idea, acquired through experience,
which enables us to "zero-in"£!! the eroperties or qualities
of thin~s.that are_meariiil<;ful, whil 7 ignoring the properties
or qualities of things which are unimportant.
The Experimenter has placed a list of the properties
and qualities of the materials which we will be using on the
table in front of you. As you can see, there are four properties or dimensions, each having three qualities or
values.
1)

The Number of Figures:

one, two, three

2)

The Shape of the Figures:
triangle

circle, square,

3)

The Color of the Figures:

red, blue, green

4)

The Shadinfi of the Figures:
cross hate ed

open, diagonal,

Each stimulus card will have a combination of one value
from each of the four dimensions. There are 81 different
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possible combinations of this sort.
The Experimenter has placed three examples of
stimulus cards on the table in front of you. As tha example cards show, one value from each dimension will be
represented on each card. Between the three example
stimuli, you can see all possible values from each dimension.
1)

One, Blue, Square, Cross Hatched

2)

Two, Red, Circle, Diagonal

3)

Three, Green, Triangle, Open

Each of the concepts that you will be learning will
be based on only two of these values. For example: "one,"
blue." In this case, one, blue are the two important-qualities or values, and all other values are unimportant
to the concept. However, this is only part of the information that you will need to solve the problem.
The other part of the information that will be
necessary is the way in which these values are related.
With two-valued concepts, there are several relationships
or rules of combination which can be used. We are going
to be concerned with four of these rules. The Experimenter
has placed on the table in front of you a list of the four
rules which we will be using. Using "A," "B" as the two
important values, these rules are:
1)

Conditional:

IF A THEN B

2)

Disjunctive:

A ORB

3)

Conjunctive:

A AND

4)

Biconditional:

B

IF A THEN

B AND IF B THEN A

----

For each stimulus you will be required to say either
"yes" or "no" depending on whether or not you think the
stimulus presented is a member of the concept group.
Remember that the concept will depend on both the rule and
the two important values. Following the previous example
of "ONE, BLUE," your response would be "yes" if the
conditions""'are met as follows for each rule:
Conditional:

IF the stimulus has ONE figure
THEN it must be BLUE-.-

80

Disjunctive:

IF the stimulus has EITHER ONE

figure OR it is BLUE
Conjunctive:

IF the stimulus has BOTH ONE figure
AND it is BLUE

Biconditional: IF the stimulus has ONE figure THEN
it must be BLUE AND IF the stimulus
is BLUE THEN it musthave ONE figure
In order to help you understand these rules, you will
practice by sorting ordinary playing cards according to each
of the rules. For practice purposes, let us say that the
playing cards have two dimensions, with two values each:
Color (red, black) and Shape (face card, numbered card). Aces
will not be used. For the practice problems you will be told
both the rule and the two important values. Your task is to
sort the cards into two categories, those which are members of
the concept group, and those which are not. You may refer to
the rule definition sheet which has been provided. Do you
have ariy questions?
For your first practice problem, the important values
are Red, Numbered Card. For each card, respond by saying
eith~"yes" or "n~using a Conditional Rule.
For the second practice problem, the important values
are Black, Face Card. For each card, respond using a ~ junctive Rule. For the third practice problem, the important values
are Red, Face Card. For each card, respond using a Biconditional Rule.For the fourth practice problem, the important values
are Black, Numbered Card. For each card, respond using a
Disjunctive Rule.
Rule learning instructions: For the problems you will
now be giveii, you will be told only the two important values.
Your task will be to discover the rule which defines the relationship between the two values. In order to prevent you
from anticipating the correct rule, it will be chosen randomly from the four rules and then replaced. In this way, any
one of the four rules could be the correct rule on-any problem.
The Experimenter will show you a·series of cards,
one at a time. For each card, respond "yes" if you feel
the important values exist in the correct relationship. If
you think the important values do not exist in the correct
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relationship, you should respond "no." The Experimenter will
record your responses and tell you if the stimulus is actually
a member of the correct group or not by saying "yes, it· is"
or "no, it is not." After the series is complete, the Experimenter will ask you to name the rule which defines the correct relationship between the important values.
Because you will not know which of the four rules has
been selected for this concept, your responses to the first
few stimulus cards will only be guesses. But, after discovering the correct responses to the stimulus patterns, you
will soon gain enough information to use the concept that has
been selected correctly. There is no penalty· for the wrong
response and no reward for the correct response. What is important is that you eventually discover the rule which defines
the correct relatio~ship between the important values. Try to
be right as often as you can, and, just as importantly, try to
gain as much info;mation as you can about the concept from eacl
pattern. Feel free to refer to the list of dimensions or the
rule definition sheet if necessary.
Do you have any questions?
Attribute identification instructions: For the problemi
you will now be given, you will be told only the rule which de·
fines the relationship between the two important values. Your
task will be to discover which two values are important. The
rule will be chosen randomly from the four rules and then replaced. In this way, any one of the four rules could be used c
any problem, and you will be told which rule has been chosen.
The Experimenter will show you a series of cards, one
a time. For each card, respond "yes" if you feel that the care
has the important values in the relationship defined by the
rule. If you think that the card does not have the important
values in the relationship defined by the rule, you should res·
pond "no." The Experimenter will record your responses and
tell you if the stimulus is actually a member of the concept
group or not, by saying "yes, it is" or "no, it is not."
After the series is complete, the Experimenter will ask you to
identify the two important values which make up the concept.
Because you will not know which are the two important
characteristics, your responses to the first few stimulus
cards will only be guesses. But, after discovering the
correct responses to the stimulus patter.ns, you will
soon gain enough information to use the ~oncept that has
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been.selected correctly. There is no penalty for the wrong
response and no reward for the correct response. What is
important is that you eventually discover the two values
which make up the concept. Try to be right as often as you
can, and, just as importantly, try to gain as much information as you can about the concept. Feel free to refer to
the list of dimensions or the rule definition sheet if
necessary.
Do you have any questions?

Random selection instructions: [The following procedure was repeated for all subjects prior to each problem].
For each problem, the conceptual rule will be chosen at
random. In order to do this, the Experimenter has assigned
one of the four conceptual rules to each of these four
Aces. You are to pick one of the four cards and the rule
which has been assigned to that card will be the chosen rule
for this problem. Do not take the card from the Experimenter and do not look at the card. Simply indicate the
card the Experimenter should use by pointing to the card.
[In the AI task condition, the subject was then informed
which rule had been chosen. In the RL task condition, the
subJect was then informed which two stimulus values would
be relevant].
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APPENDIX B

· Stimulus Dimensions

DIMENSIONS

VALUES

Number of Figures:

ONE

TWO

THREE

Shape of Figures:

CIRCLE

SQUARE

TRIANGLE

Color of Figures:

RED

BLUE

GREEN

Shading of Figures:

OPEN

DIAGONAL

CROSS HATCHED
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APPENDIX C

Rules Definitions
Conditional:

IF A THEN B

Disjunctive:

A ORB

Conj unc·ti ve:

A AND B

Bicondition:al:

. 'IF A THEN B, AND :!!:, B THEN A
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